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Abstract- The assignment of tasks to employees is one of the 
most essential aspects of a project manager's job.  A situation 
with employees working on tasks that they are not well-
suited for can lead to a significant loss of time and resources 
in addition to a sub-par product or service.  The simple 
difference between a good and bad task assignment for 
employees can easily result in major differences in a 
company's bottom line.
We utilize techniques from game theory to produce an 
algorithm for matching employees and tasks based on 
manager and employee preference, employee time, and 
employee skills.  As a result, we have created a deterministic 
algorithm for task assignment with built-in feedback 
mechanisms for measuring the health of the project group 
with respect to the work given.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Skalebund [5] writes that 27% of managers' time and 
$105 billion annually is spent working with and correcting 
employees who are not sufficiently suited for their tasks. 
In order to reduce this number, we have examined the 
state of task assignment in project management and have 
devised   an   algorithm   to   produce   a   repeatable   task 
assignment to workers.  Currently implemented solutions 
often ignore employee preference of which tasks they 
work on which inhibits employee productivity [3].  Those 
that do take employee preference into consideration are 
non-deterministic,   thus   making   it   more   difficult   to 
evaluate the business process in an efficient manner.
We have taken into consideration the satisfaction and 
ownership of the problem by the employee and also the 
desires of the manager to have employees work on tasks 
for which they are most qualified for and to distribute the 
work load as evenly as logistically possible.  In this sense, 
we seek to satisfy both the manager and the employee 
while doing so in a reproducible manner, so decision can 
be analyzed and used to improve the production process.
II.  BACKGROUND
Currently applied approaches to this problem involve a 
manager assigning tasks without considering the explicit 
preferences of employees or a more progressive, but time-
consuming   process   of   discussing   tasks   with   each 
employee to understand their perspective.   While the 
discussion is a step in the right direction, managers do not 
have   a   deterministic   method   for   converting   the 
information from the discussion into a task matching.  
Currently planning software is available, but not open 
about its algorithmic  background.    Most of  the  task 
assignment in this planning software does not take into 
account   employee   preferences,   but   rather   just   the 
manager's assessment of employee qualification, such as 
SUMit Roster Software [6].
A related field to this problem is Job Shop Scheduling 
[1].  One of the leading actively-researched algorithms in 
this area is the TABU Search.   Results from this algorithm 
have shown to be highly effective, but the algorithm itself 
does  not  explicitly   account   for  many   of  the  factors, 
including the two-sided nature of the task assignment, that 
we want to account for. Two-sided   matching   theory 
addresses the issue of matching two distinct sets of entities 
when both have potentially differing preferences, leading 
to potential stability problems.  A stable matching is one in 
which no member m of the first set prefers another match 
w' to its current match, w, while the other potential match, 
w', is either not matched or prefers m to its current match, 
m'.  Gale and Shapely proposed an algorithm for stable 
matching   that   they   proved   always   provides   a   stable 
matching. 
A stable matching is a matching which can be said to 
not be unstable.  The definition of an unstable matching is 
one in which there exists a man M who prefers a woman 
W to his mate, W', and W prefers M to her mate, M'.  It 
has been shown [2] that there always exists a stable 
matching for any two sets.  
The Gale-Shapely Courtship Algorithm can be given as 
follows:
1. Some man proposes to his highest preferred 
woman and they attach
2. Some   other   man   proposes   to   his   highest 
preferred woman and they attach if she is 
unattached or if she prefers him to the man she 
is currently attached to
Step 2 is repeated until either all men are attached or 
have been rejected by all of their acceptable mates.
III.  OUR APPROACH
Due to the involvement of humans in such problems, it 
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Further more, due to the fact that employees who have 
both ownership and enjoyment of their tasks are more 
productive, simply matching tasks to the most qualified 
employee will not always produce a better result.  It is 
necessary to take into account the task preferences of 
individuals.   In   this   paper,   we   propose   an   approach 
utilizing two-sided matching in order to provide an apt 
matching of tasks to employees.  
Since an examination of the existing solutions reveals 
that these were not designed to handle the complexities in 
the   above   situation,   we   modified   a   game-theoretical 
algorithm that most closely fits our problem to meet the 
requirements for task assignment.
From examining current solutions, we determined that a 
successful mathematical approach must be able to handle:
1. Preferences of both managers and employees
2. Employees that have a limited amount of time 
and tasks that require time to complete
3. Cases in which employees (because of skills, 
time, etc.) are not capable of completing the 
tasks
4. Cases in which employees are overabundant in 
comparison to the number of tasks
Direct application of the Gale-Shapely algorithm 
may lead to a situation where some members do not have 
assigned tasks and some tasks have no assigned members. 
To overcome this problem, we modify the Gale-
Shapely   algorithm   to   resemble   a   weighted   knapsack 
algorithm. This adds a weight to each task, which is the 
estimated time  required to  complete  the task.   Each 
employee now has an allotment of time available to fill 
with tasks. Furthermore, we introduce callbacks to counter 
the effect of rejected tasks. 
A task structure contains the following:
• Identifier
• Estimated Time Required
• Preference List
• Pointer to Next Non-Rejected Preference
An employee structure is defined by:
• Identifier
• Time Available
• Preference List
• Pointer to Next Non-Rejected Preference
• Callback List
Our algorithm can be described as follows:
1. A task from the set of unattached tasks selects 
its   highest   preference   worker   that   has   not 
rejected it.
2. If the worker prefers the task to their current 
task and has time to do the task, then he 
accepts the task.
3. If the task that is replaced can no longer be 
completed in the amount of time available, it 
becomes unattached and establishes a callback
4. The worker then recalls the highest (if any) 
preferred task that it has a callback for that it 
now has time freed for.
5. Repeat starting at step 1 until all tasks have 
been   assigned   or   rejected   by   all   preferred 
workers.
As with the Gale-Shapely algorithm [2] our algorithm 
will terminate when all tasks have been assigned, or they 
have been rejected by all workers the process terminates. 
Termination is guaranteed to occur since the preference 
rankings   mean   that   there   are   no   deadlock   or   loop 
conditions.  
IV.  DISCUSSION
The theoretical results of our algorithm lie primarily in 
the feedback mechanisms provided by the potential cases 
that  can   result  from  the  algorithm.   These  feedback 
mechanisms are a valuable perk of the algorithm that can 
be utilized in determining the necessary composition of a 
group along with providing stronger employee evaluation 
reviews.  These three feedback mechanisms presented are 
the two polar cases and the median case of the result 
spectrum.  
A. Unmatched Tasks
After the execution, unmatched tasks can imply several 
possibilities.  Each of these has different approaches for 
resolution and need to be well studied before choosing a 
specific course of action.
  First, the number of employees available to complete 
the set of tasks is insufficient.  This is evidently the case 
when the unmatched tasks fill the time of the available 
employees.  This scenario can alert a manager of worker 
efficiency or the necessity of hiring new employees.  
Second, the set of employees is not sufficient for the 
tasks required.  This is the case when there is still time left 
for the employees to complete tasks, but there are still 
unmatched tasks remaining.  In this case, the collective 
skill set of the employees does not encompass the tasks as 
it should or is not distributed well enough to distribute the 
tasks with the time given.  There are two ways to remedy 
this situation.   Providing employees (particularly those 
with smaller skill sets and those who consistently do not 
receive many tasks) with additional training will increase 
their skill set and allow them to perform more of the tasks 
needed by the group.  An alternative to this solution is to 
hire new employees/contractors in order to supplement the 
skills of the current group.
B. Unmatched/Excess Worker Time
Unmatched workers and excessive amounts of worker 
time remaining imply that there are more than enough 
workers to complete the tasks.  In this case, it becomes 
efficient to take on new projects in addition to the current 
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manager  should   evaluate  the  necessity  to   keep   these 
workers on this particular project and take necessary 
actions based on that information (potentially relocating a 
worker to a project which suits him or her better).
C. Perfect Match
If the algorithm executes completely and all tasks and 
employees receive a matching, then the group is well 
suited for the set of tasks.  The resulting match is a task-
optimal stable matching (meaning that no task can be 
given to a worker which the manager prefers more in any 
other possible stable matching).
V.  FUTURE WORK
Since task assignment is only one module of a working 
business group, this work and the applications developed 
during this process need to be integrated into a full 
business   solution.     Proper  avenues   for  feedback   and 
change need to be established with the individual group to 
utilize the mechanisms discussed in this paper.
These approaches have been shown to have theoretical 
merit; however, we have not had the opportunity to see 
observe them in practice.  Examining a case study of a 
business group operating based on the algorithm presented 
in these papers is the next step in this line of research.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The proposed algorithm uses a mathematically based 
approach to efficiently assigning tasks to members.  The 
primary   advantages   of   taking   a   mathematical   and 
algorithmic approach to project management is that in 
analysis and review of a project cycle, the results of the 
assignment are reproducible and can be utilized to refine 
the inputs of the algorithm and the business process as a 
whole.
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